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Silicon Valley isn’t a special place for invention and for
startups because of special infrastructure or special laws, but
because of special ideas and special norms. Those norms don’t
hold up in court, and they erode a little bit every time someone
like [Zynga’s CEO Mark] Pincus only thinks about what they
can get away with instead of what’s right. This reduces the
perceived value of equity for everyone in the valley, makes
everyone less open, less trusting, less willing to take a risk. In
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the end, we all lose for that.
If I had my way, Pincus would never work in this town
again. Anyone involved in this decision should be made a
pariah. If we don’t defend the norms that make innovation
possible, we’ll lose them.
—Lambent_Cactus at Hacker News1
INTRODUCTION
Mark Pincus, Chief Executive of Zynga, Inc., did not offer
big salaries to the talent he recruited to his popular online
gaming company when it was just starting up, but he did give
out a lot of stock options.2 For many early employees, this
turned out to be a great deal. Zynga went public in December
2011,3 and is now a multibillion-dollar company.4 For other
employees, the deal was less favorable. As Zynga prepared to
go public, Pincus and other top executives decided some
Zynga employees had gotten too many stock options. So
Pincus took the controversial step of demanding that these
purportedly over-valued employees give back some of their
options to the company or else be fired and lose all of their
options that had not already vested.5 I call this the Zynga
clawback. According to the Wall Street Journal, Zynga
executives said “they didn’t want a ‘Google chef’ situation.”6
1. Lambent_Cactus, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock,
HACKER NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218997.
2. Justin Scheck & Shayndi Raice, Zynga Leans on Some Workers to
Surrender
Pre-IPO
Shares,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Nov.
10,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020462190457701837322348080
2.html.
3. Evelyn M. Rusli, For Zynga’s I.P.O., Pomp and a Slump, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2011, at B3.
4. Id.
5. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2.
6. Id. (explaining that shortly before the company’s IPO, Zynga CEO
Pincus pressured employees to surrender stock options); see also Rebecca
Greenfield, Zynga Defends Its Scandalous Options System, ATLANTIC WIRE
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/2011/11/zyngadefends-its-scandalous-options-system/44839/ (stating that Pincus defends
controversial decision as a “meritocracy”); Gary Rivlin, Zynga’s IPO Gives
Founder Mark Pincus a Stock Class All His Own, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/14/zynga-s-ipo-gives-foundermark-pincus-a-stock-class-all-his-own.html (“[Pincus will] have 70 votes for
every supershare of Zynga he owns. . . . [T]he roughly 100 million shares . . .
offered to the masses . . . [will] provide a mere one vote per share.”); Evelyn M.
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The Zynga executives were referring to Charlie Ayers, a
chef who went to work for Google in its early days and was
paid partly in stock options.7 These options were reported
ultimately to be worth around $26 million after Google went
public.8 To Zynga executives, the term Google chef was a
rebus for an employee who was granted a quantity of stock
options that turned out to be worth far more than the
employee was worth to the company. The food at Google may
have been good, but for his six years of work, Google paid
Ayers more than $4 million per year9—surely far too much.
Or was it? When Ayers agreed to work for cash and stock
options, he presumably contemplated the possibility that they
might someday be worth a lot of money, perhaps even as
much as $26 million. Had Google come back to him when it
appeared they might be worth a princely sum and demanded
some of them back, Ayers might reasonably have accused
them of acting opportunistically. If a homeowner were to pay
a painter for painting his house with lottery tickets that had
a modest expected value, any first year law student should be
able to tell you that the homeowner should not be able to get
the lottery tickets back if they later turned out to be worth
millions. The homeowner took that risk when he decided to
pay in lottery tickets. Buyer’s remorse is not grounds for
Is the Zynga situation any
overturning a contract.10
different? Is Pincus one of those (near) billionaires who think
the rules don’t apply to them?
Rusli, Zynga: Bully or Meritocracy?, NYTIMES.COM DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2011,
6:23 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/zynga-bully-or-meritocracy/
(reporting that Twitter’s masses condemned Pincus’s behavior as “despicable,”
“foolish,” and even “evil” after the Wall Street Journal’s article accused him of
clawing back employee shares); Richard Waters, Zynga Rethinks Silicon Valley
Pay
Structures,
FIN.
TIMES
(Nov.
11,
2011,
12:17
AM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5997a58a-0bf5-11e1-931000144feabdc0.html#
axzz20hR78NTg (noting that Zynga has asked some executives to hand back
their unvested stock as a condition of remaining at the company).
7. See STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND
SHAPES OUR LIVES 133 (2011). See generally Adam Lusher, Chef Lifts Lid on
Google’s Recipe for Success, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 23, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582494/Chef-lifts-lid-on-Googlesrecipe-for-success.html.
8. See Lusher, supra note 7.
9. See generally id.
10. See generally 30 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:10
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2012).
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Actually, the Zynga clawback is different. Under the
laws of California,11 Zynga was within its rights to demand
that (in its view) underperforming employees either give back
some of their unvested stock options or be fired. The reason
for this is that employees of technology startups in Silicon
Valley and in other entrepreneurial hubs, who are neither
founders nor C-level executives, are almost always employees
at will.12 Under the at-will doctrine, an employer may
terminate an employee at any time, for any reason or for no
reason.13 Employees are also free to quit at any time, for any
Precedents in California and
reason or no reason.14
Delaware, as well as other states, make it reasonably clear
that it is permissible under the at-will employment doctrine
to fire an employee because she became too expensive given
the terms of her stock option plan.15 Companies may fire atwill employees for any reason, and being overcompensated is
as good as any other reason or no reason.

11. Zynga is incorporated in Delaware but was probably a quasi-foreign
California corporation before its IPO. See generally CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115
(2010). According to this section, foreign corporations not traded on a national
exchange or NASDAQ, more than fifty percent of whose shares are held by
California residents and more than fifty percent of the average of whose
property, payroll, and sales is allocable to California, must comply with certain
requirements of California corporate law. See id.; see also Wilson v. La.-Pac.
Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 854–63 (Ct. App. 1982); W. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727–29 (Ct. App. 1961) (finding that regulations of
the Commissioner of Corporations regarding quasi-foreign corporations are
consistent with the internal affairs doctrine). See generally Stephen R. Ginger,
Regulation of Quasi-Foreign Corporations in California: Reflections on Section
2115 After Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 14 SW. U. L. REV. 665,
667, 671–83 (1984).
12. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET, at xvi–xvii, 93–94 (2003).
13. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (2012) (“An employment, having no specified
term, may be terminated at the will of either party . . . .”); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l,
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 & n.8 (Cal. 2000) (explaining that at-will employment
may be terminated at any time, with or without cause, for any lawful reason or
no reason at all, assuming that there was no violation of public policy involved);
Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 839–840 (Cal. 1995) (explaining the
strong Common Law presumption that an employee may be terminated at will);
Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 471 (Ct. App.
2010) (explaining that at-will employment relationships may be terminated for
any lawful reason, or no reason at all).
14. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (2012).
15. Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A
Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 719 (2006).
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Even if a good reason were required, firing an employee
because she costs shareholders more in dilution than she
added to the value of the corporation through her work might
satisfy such a test. One could argue that a chief executive
such as Zynga’s Pincus had a duty to his company’s
shareholders, albeit one it would be impractical to enforce
judicially,16 to shed employees who took more value out of the
company in equity claims than they put in through labor. If a
company could legally cast such an employee over the side,
then over the side she should presumably go, if we suppose
the job of management is to maximize the value of the
company to its shareholders.17
Zynga clawbacks may be legal, but are they a good idea?
The answer, legally speaking, is not necessarily. The Wall
Street Journal worries that “[if] Zynga’s demand for the
return of shares . . . were . . . to catch on and spread, [it]
would erode a central pillar of Silicon Valley culture.”18 This
anxiety is justified. A central pillar of Silicon Valley business
culture, as the Wall Street Journal notes, is that “start-ups
with limited cash and a risk of failure dangle the possibility of
stock riches in order to lure talent.”19 The furor caused by the
Zynga clawback suggests that many Silicon Valley employees
did not realize that clawbacks were possible.20 Perhaps they
naively thought simply that if the startup they joined became
improbably successful, they would become improbably rich.

16. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 passim (2004).
17. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (“[F]rom the
traditional legal viewpoint, a corporation’s directors and officers have a
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth, subject to numerous duties to
meet specific obligations to other groups affected by the corporation.”). See
generally Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A
Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 230
(1999).
18. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Jungle Joe, Comment to Evaluating Stock Offer as Part of
Compensation, ARS TECHNICA (Jun. 1, 2012, 6:25 AM) (“What is an ‘option
clawback’?”); see also Semil Shah, Clawbacks and Startups Don’t Mix,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 10, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/10/clawbacksstartups/ (stating that “[s]tartups are supposed to be different” from other
businesses, like hedge funds, where employers are fired on a whim).
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The Wall Street Journal is correct to worry about Zynga
clawbacks. If they become standard, they could chill the
entrepreneurial ardor of potential startup employees.21
Zynga clawbacks have a perverse logic. The more successful
a startup company is, the more its stock options will be worth.
The more they are worth, the more likely it is that the
company will regret having given so many of them to its
employees. Thus the more successful a company is, the more
likely it is, other things equal, that it will want to claw back
some of the options it has issued to employees.22 Smart
potential startup employees will foresee this possibility and
their incentives to work for stock options will be reduced.
Yet from management’s point of view, clawbacks are not
necessarily opportunistic at all. Journalistic accounts of
Pincus’s behavior at Zynga are at least consistent with the
account that he sincerely believed that the employees from
whom he wanted options back were not living up to
reasonable expectations. It might have been the employees,
not Pincus and his company, who were behaving
opportunistically. One function of at-will doctrine is to reduce
opportunism by employees. An employer that hires an
employee not at-will but for a term can fire the employee only
for a good cause, which is notoriously difficult for employers

21. One commenter on Hacker News, the popular social news website about
computer hacking and startup companies, exclaimed:
Wow this should be straight up illegal and yet:
“One lawyer said that over the past year, he has heard executives of
three social-media sites discuss the possibility of clawing back equity
from some employees. Another lawyer, who has handled stockcompensation issues with technology companies for decades, said he
never saw a company try to take equity from employees until about two
years ago, but has since seen three such cases at start-ups.”
I don’t see how this is anything other than theft. They’re saying that
either you give us some of your compensation back (you may not have
joined if it were not for those stock options/grants) or you’re fired and
lose it all. Insane.
smokinn, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock, HACKER NEWS
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218880.
Another
commenter opined: “This is bad for the start-up community. There isn’t much
reason for a great hacker to join start-up if he/she thinks you might want to
play ‘take-backs’ if the company succeeds.” DevX101, Comment to Zynga Chief
Seeks
to
Claw
Back Stock,
Hacker
News
(Nov.
10,
2011),
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218884.
22. See Scheck & Raice, supra note 2.
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to establish.23 Employees who can be fired only for cause can
perform perfunctorily,24 just above the standard that would
get them fired, and still collect the compensation due under
the employment contract. Startups hire at will partly to
reduce this shirking behavior. Renegotiating an employment
contract with an underperforming employee for fewer stock
options in the shadow of an at-will termination might merely
be an instance of using the at-will doctrine exactly as it
should be used.
As this Article will show, hiring startup workers as atwill employees and compensating them partly with stock
options is economically complex. It is a business practice that
has evolved over time and serves several important functions.
Under existing law, Pincus and Zynga could indeed legally
claw back options. Yet their ability to do so is worrisome and
highlights a way in which existing startup employment
practice could be improved, at least in some cases. After
discussing the purposes served by the current practice, this
Article will consider an alternative contractual arrangement
that prospective startup employees could negotiate for that
would restrict clawbacks and make the work-compensation
exchange more efficient.
I.

THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND STOCK OPTION
PLANS

A modern stock option plan has a fairly straightforward
contract at its core, though with all its details of
implementation, it is a fearsomely complicated legal beast.25
The complexity results mostly from having to comply with
complex tax and securities laws,26 but it is the basic structure
of the core contract that allows Zynga clawbacks to occur.

23. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Employment-at-Will—Is the Model Act the
Answer?, 23 STETSON L. REV. 179, 189 (1993).
24. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J.
ECON. 1, 6 (2008).
25. E.g., Zynga Inc., 2007 Equity Incentive Plan Stock Option Agreement
[hereinafter 2007 Zynga Plan], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1439404/000119312511315435/d198836dex103.htm.
26. See, e.g., How to Handle Employee Stock Options, CNNMONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/money101/lesson10/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2013).
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The arrangement between a startup such as Zynga and a
nonfounder employee is best thought of as having two parts.
The first part is the employment agreement itself. For most
of the talent that a startup hires, the employment
relationship is at will.27 The at-will employment relationship
allows either the hiring company or the employee to
terminate the relationship at any time, whether for a good
cause, a bad cause, or no cause at all.28 Professors of
employment law have harshly criticized this doctrine, but
American courts still enforce it.29 The second part of the
startup-employee relationship is the stock option plan itself.
Ideally, soon after it is founded, or at least before it starts
to grant stock options, a startup will establish a stock option
plan. This plan is the overall structure that sets forth the
specific terms of the stock options that the company will
grant to some of its employees.30 Part of this arrangement
will be a stock option agreement, which is the contract
between a particular employee and the company that grants
the options, subject to the terms of the stock option plan.31
The stock option agreement is styled as a grant of options to
the employee, but the options are nothing like gifts or
gratuities. Instead, courts generally recognize that the
options are granted in exchange for the employee working for

27. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 590 (1999) (highlighting that Silicon Valley engineers
shifted between firms so frequently that it became the norm, indicating an atwill relationship between the employees and employers).
28. See generally Maureen S. Binetti et al., The Employment-At-Will
Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swallowed the Rule? Common Law Limitations
upon an Employer’s Control over Employees-At-Will, in 1 HANDLING WRONGFUL
TERMINATION CLAIMS 2001, at 577, 587 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 650, 2001); Julia Barnhart, Comment, The Implied-InFact Contract Exception to At-Will Employment: A Call for Reform, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 817 (1998); Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment
Doctrine: Imposed Terms, Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the
Workplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84 (2007).
29. For a good summary of the status of the at-will employment doctrine in
the United States, see Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the
Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 66–70
(2008).
30. Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock
Options and Rule 10B-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546 (2003).
31. See id.
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the company—that is, the employee working for the company
serves as consideration for the stock option agreement.32
Because the stock option agreement is supported by
consideration, it is legally enforceable, and efforts to attack
these agreements as lacking consideration typically have
failed.33
The 2007 Zynga Equity Incentive Plan recites a purpose
that is typical for stock option plans.34 The purpose of the
plan, it says, is:
[T]o provide incentives to attract, retain and motivate
eligible persons whose present and potential contributions
are important to the success of the Company, its Parent
and Subsidiaries by offering eligible persons an
opportunity to participate in the Company’s future
performance through awards of Options, Restricted Stock,
and Restricted Stock Units.35

To accomplish this, the overall structure of the plan is that of
a unilateral contract.36 The plan offers the award of stock
options to the employee in return for her continuing to work
for the company, which is her acceptance of the offer. Put
another way, the performance invited and induced by this
offer is the forbearance by the employee from exercising the
right she has as an at-will employee to terminate the
employment relationship at any time for any reason. This
unilateral structure means that the contract is formed
continuously, as it were, as the employee continues working
for the company.
32. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. Ch. 1952).
33. E.g., Church v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., No. 3:05CV422, 2008 WL 5429604,
at *14 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2008); Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int’l, Inc., 544 A.2d 170,
176 (Conn. 1988); Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 194 P.3d 96, 105 (Nev.
2008).
34. Bodie, supra note 30, at 548.
35. Zynga Game Network Inc., 2007 Equity Incentive Plan § 1, available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1439404/000119312511190294/dex102.htm.
36. See Chinn v. China Nat’l Aviation Corp., 291 P.2d 91, 92 (Cal. Ct. App.
1955) (“Of late years the attitude of the courts (as well as of employers in
general) is to consider regulations of this type which offer additional advantages
to employees as being in effect offers of a unilateral contract which offer is
accepted if the employee continues in the employment, and not as being mere
offers of gifts.”); see also Newberger v. Rifkind, 104 Cal. Rptr. 663, 667 (Ct. App.
1972) (discussing an implied unilateral contract for stock option agreement);
Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 813–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (inferring an
enforceable promise to pay pension benefits from employer’s personnel policies).
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The plan creates the incentive for the employee to keep
working for the company through an option-vesting
schedule.37 The option-vesting schedule is the timetable by
which the employee may actually exercise her stock options to
buy company stock. When the company first grants the
employee options, they are typically not exercisable
immediately to buy stock. First they have to vest.38 Under
the Zynga 2007 Equity Incentive Plan, which is typical of
Silicon Valley plans in this respect,39 twenty-five percent of
the total option grant vests (the vesting cliff) one year after
the vesting clock starts running on the day the employee is
The
hired, which is when the options are granted.40
remaining seventy-five percent vests in thirty-six equal parts
each month over the succeeding three years.41 Thus if the
employee quits within one year of the day she is hired (and
the day she gets her option grant), she loses the right to buy
any stock. She has to work for the company for a full year to
be able to exercise twenty-five percent of her options, and for
four years to be able to exercise all of the options the company
granted her when she was hired.42 In this way, the vesting
schedule likely gives the employee an incentive to continue
working for the company, at least for four years. The longer
she stays at the company, up to four years, the more of her
options she will be able to exercise to buy company stock.
Well-drafted stock option plans are careful to provide
that nothing about the stock option arrangement changes the
at-will relationship between the employee and the company.

37. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 2.1.
38. See id. (indicating that the vesting start date will be set forth in the
agreement).
39. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S
GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW 99 (4th ed. 2012).
40. See id. In order to insure compliance with section 409A of the Internal
Revenue Code, the best conservative practice is actually for the Board to grant
options to all employees who have started with the Company since the last
board meeting, instead of authorizing the CEO to make new-hire grants on the
date of hire, which was the traditional practice. Vesting can still begin on the
hire date if the conservative practice is followed. Patrick J. Rondeau &
Kimberly B. Wethly, Best Practices for Option Grants by Venture-Backed
Companies, in ADVANCED VENTURE CAPITAL 2008, at 45, 48 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1666, 2008).
41. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 39, at 99.
42. Id.
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The 2007 Zynga Plan, under which the clawed back options
were issued, is no exception. “Nothing in the Plan or this
Agreement” it states, “shall confer on Participant any right to
continue in the employ of, or other relationship with, the
Company . . . or limit in any way the right of the Company . . .
to terminate Participant’s employment or other relationship
at any time, with or without Cause.”43 This critical term
made the Zynga clawback legally possible. Nothing in the
stock option plan changes the fact that the company and the
employee have an at-will relationship with each other. The
company can still terminate the employee for good cause, bad
cause, or no cause. That is reportedly what Zynga threatened
to do to some employees if they did not give back some of their
options to the company.44
The mechanics of how termination affects options under
a stock option plan are worth reviewing. The 2007 Zygna
Plan divides terminations into three classes: termination
because of death or disability, termination for cause, and
termination for any other reason.45 In the last case, a not-forcause termination, the terminated employee would
apparently be able to exercise as many of her options as had
already vested by her termination date, as long as she did so
before three months after her termination or the expiration
date of the options, whichever was earlier.46 The impact of a
for-cause termination appears to be harsher than withoutcause termination for the employee. The Zynga agreement
states that “[i]f the Participant is terminated for Cause,
Participant’s Options expire immediately upon such
Termination.”47 This must mean at a minimum that the
employee’s unvested options expire immediately and so
cannot ever be exercised. The agreement is somewhat murky
as to what is to become of vested but unexercised options, but
they are probably meant to expire as well. Options do not
exercise themselves. An employee ordinarily must present an
43. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 3.4.
44. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2.
45. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, §§ 3.1–3.3.
46. In another example of poor draftsmanship, the expiration date is defined
as being limited, inter alia, by section 5.6 of the Agreement, when the
agreement has no section 5.6. See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25.
47. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25. § 3.3.
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executed form to the company, along with a check or other
permitted form of payment for the exercise price, in order to
exercise vested options.48 Thus, a terminated employee might
have vested options but not yet have exercised them.
Conventional investing wisdom is that, consistent with option
pricing theory, employees should hold options as long as
possible before exercising them.49 The Zynga agreement,
though not clearly drafted, then, appears to have the harsh
result of punishing employees for following conventional
investment strategies by terminating both unvested and
vested but unexercised options the terminated employee may
have. In other words, Zynga employees terminated without
cause would lose all of their unvested options, and Zynga
employees terminated with cause would lose all of their
unvested options, and possibly all of the unexercised options
(whether vested or not).
The two parts of the employment arrangement between
the startup company and the employee, the at-will
relationship and the stock options, thus work together. The
employment relationship itself is at will. One may call this
relationship a contract, but if it is, it’s an illusory one because
neither the employee nor the employer is under any
obligation to continue the relationship.50 The stock option
plan, on the other hand, is part of a bona fide unilateral
contract.51 It is a standing offer that the company will
recognize the options as vesting according to the schedule and
will be obliged to issue stock upon the exercise of the vested
options as long as the employee continues to work for the
employer and fulfills any other obligations that may be in the
plan (such as a nondisclosure covenant, for example). The
employee’s continued work at the company is the acceptance
48. Id. at §§ 4.1, 4.3.
49. See How to Handle Employee Stock Options, supra note 26.
50. Lord, supra note 15, at 714–15.
51. California law provides that “[i]n cases involving employee benefits,
such as pension plans and stock options, the rule has developed that the offer of
such bonuses constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract, which is accepted if
the employee continues in employment after the offer.” DiGiacinto v. Ameriko–
Omserv Corp., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 300, 303 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added).
“ ‘ Consideration is inherent where stock options are granted to employees and
the employee continues employment knowing of the options . . . .’ ” Id. at 303–
04 (quoting Newberger v. Rifkind, 104 Cal. Rptr. 663, 665 (Ct. App. 1972)).
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by performance of the unilateral contract offer made to the
employee by company in its stock option plan.52
The company’s obligation to perform arises only if the
employee actually remains in the employ of the company for
the time periods contemplated by the vesting schedule.53 If
the company terminates the employee, options that have not
yet vested will not vest because the employee will not be
performing in the manner required by the stock option plan
offer. Perhaps counter-intuitively to the nonlawyer, it does
not matter that the employee is not working for the company
because the company terminated her. The stock option plan
makes this clear, providing for it expressly.54 If an employee
no longer works for the company, regardless of the reason,
her options that have not already vested will not do so and
her vested, unexercised options may even expire immediately
if the company terminates her for cause.
It is this
consequence of termination that allows the company to
bargain with an employee by making the following threat:
either give back some of your unvested options or we will take
all of them back by terminating you.
The peculiar pairing of an illusory, at-will contract and a
unilateral stock option plan contract may seem odd. Why do
startup firms structure most of their employment
relationships in this way? The basic economics of contract
theory sheds light on this question. This structure creates
some problems, but it is far from irrational.
II. AGENCY THEORY AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRM
Startups face the usual agency problems that other firms
face, but often in aggravated form. Startups must select
employees suited to the particular challenges of
entrepreneurial firms, which means choosing employees who
are willing and able to be entrepreneurial themselves.
Startup compensation, with its emphasis on risky stock
options, helps address agency problems, but also brings with
it problems of its own.55 Highly risky and potentially

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 2.
Id. at §§ 3.1–3.3.
Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 42 UCLA L.
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remunerative options present special opportunities and risks
This section discusses
to both employees and firms.56
startups and stock option compensation from the perspective
of agency theory and incomplete contracts theory and then
discusses some interesting and potentially problematic
features of option packages that can turn out to be extremely
valuable.
A. Agency Theory
One approach economists and economics-oriented legal
scholars have taken to explain employment relationships is
agency theory.57 From this perspective, standard employment
contracts address fundamental agency problems that arise in
employment relationships.58 The startup hiring an employee
faces the same agency cost problems as do other firms,
sometimes arguably in aggravated form. These problems are
traditionally divided into two categories: moral hazards and
adverse selection problems.59 Adverse selection is closely
related to moral hazard. An example of the latter is the
problem that the absence of sufficient monitoring may
actually induce the employee shirking behavior the firm
hopes to avoid, while an example of the former is that persons
inclined to shirk will seek out a job where their performance
will be difficult to monitor.60
REV. 1737, 1750–51 (1994).
56. See Scheck & Raice, supra note 2.
57. The classic article in the legal literature is Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981), and the
most cited is probably Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976). For formal treatments, see Bengt Holmstrom, The
Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 75–76 (1999); Bengt
Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 972 (1994); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 24 (1991); Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Transfer Pricing and
Organizational Form, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1991). For a nice summary of
the theoretical and an interesting survey of the empirical literature, see D.
Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV.
1, 29 (2009).
58. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 57, at 1090.
59. See Smith & King, supra note 57, at 13–14.
60. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). Adverse
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1. The Moral Hazard Problem
Moral hazard arises from the misalignment of employer
and employee incentives.61 An assembly line worker is hired
to do work that is boring and unpleasant, and the worker will
do as little as he must to get paid a contractually agreed
amount.62 To her employer, labor is a costly, productive
factor. The firm will pay as little for labor as it can given
market conditions and wants to get as much work as possible
for each dollar of wages paid.63 The incentives of employer
and employee are thus significantly, though not entirely,
opposed.
The employer must engage in costly monitoring to
incentivize performance on the labor contract and this
monitoring is unlikely to eliminate shirking entirely. The
costliness or impossibility of monitoring employee
productivity incentivizes overselling by employees (whether
deliberate or inadvertent) during the hiring process and
shirking afterwards.64
Startups may face these common problems in aggravated
form. More established companies have defined roles and
established routines for employees to follow and to measure
employee performance.65 An established firm might want an
employee to perform certain coding functions or to operate a
particular machine, for example. Startups on the other hand
are typically searching for early employees who not only have

selection, as Smith and King usefully put it, is often seen as an information
problem, while moral hazard is often seen as an incentive problem. Smith &
King, supra note 57, at 14. Adverse selection is best dealt with through ex ante
measures and moral hazard through ex post incentive alignment. Id. In fact,
both are both information and incentive problems, but some are better
addressed ex ante and some ex post.
61. See James A. Mirrlees, The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable
Behaviour: Part I, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 3 (1999); see also Bengt Holmstrom,
Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECONOMICS 74 (1979).
62. See generally Mirrlees, supra note 61, at 3.
63. Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four Day Workweeks:
Employer Sympathy or a Call to Action, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1139, 1166 (2010).
64. Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 510, 518–19 (1989).
65. See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 316 (1998) (discussing the vertical structure used to
prevent shirking where a board of directors monitors managers and managers
monitor employees).
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particular technical skills, but also have the ability to solve
creatively the sort of difficult-to-anticipate problems new
businesses regularly encounter.66 The contributions that a
particular employee makes to the firm are usually not easily
measurable. The company will pay the employee under the
employment contract, however, even if she contributes less to
the firm than it anticipated, because her underperformance
will not be known.
In order to help align the incentives of employees with
those of the startup, startups grant employees stock options.67
Stock options will become valuable (perhaps very valuable) if
the startup reaches a liquidity event, normally an initial
public offering (IPO) or a sale of the startup to an established
company (buyout).68 If stock options work as intended, the
startup employee will do everything within her power to help
the startup reach the liquidity event because that is what will
make her stock options valuable, just as it will the stock of
founders and investors, who control the firm. The incentives
of employees, founders, and investors are thus brought more
into alignment with one another.
Stock options do not work perfectly for this purpose.
Even in a small startup with only a few dozen or hundred
employees, a particular employee may realize that her
individual efforts are unlikely to have a material effect on
whether the firm succeeds in attaining a liquidity event. The
liquidity event is a binary occurrence—it happens or it does
not.69 An employee’s efforts beyond what is necessary to get
the firm to the event are wasted if she considers the matter
self-interestedly. If other workers are doing their jobs, a
given worker’s marginal contribution toward getting to the
liquidity event may be nominal. If this is the case, the
perfunctory employee will work hard enough to avoid
termination under the at-will doctrine, but no harder.

66. Margaret Heffernan, 4 Characteristics of the Ultimate Start-Up Hire,
INC.COM (Feb. 7, 2013), www.inc.com/margaret-heffernan/ultimate-startup-hirecharacteristics.html.
67. Bankman, supra note 55, at 1750.
68. See Scheck & Raice, supra note 2.
69. See Rachel S. Tennis & Alexander Baier Schwab, Business Model
Innovation and Antitrust Law, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 307, 330 (2012).
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From the firm’s point of view, stock options granted to an
employee in this position are wasted since this employee’s
efforts, beyond those required to avoid termination, are by
hypothesis not necessary to reach a liquidity event.70 This
employee need not be incentivized by stock options in order
for the firm to get to the liquidity event. Indeed, as the
startup history unfolds, the particular employee may discover
that she is not so incentivized once she realizes that her
efforts are not that important to the company and,
accordingly, reduces her efforts to the perfunctory level. After
all, she would get the benefit of the liquidity event whether
she performs perfunctorily or consummately, and if a
liquidity event never occurs, she has not wasted her efforts.
Monitoring by the firm may or may not discover what the
employee is doing, but if the firm does discover it, it will want
Zynga
to renegotiate the employee’s compensation.71
clawbacks address this situation.72
If the firm could not renegotiate the compensation
arrangement, the firm would be faced with two options: either
it could terminate the perfunctorily performing employee and
avoid the dilution from her stock options vesting, or it could
refrain from terminating her and allow her stock options to
vest. If renegotiation were possible, the firm would have a
third option—not terminating the employee, but reducing or
eliminating her stock option participation and its consequent
dilution. Suppose the startup firm’s preference ordering is
Renegotiate > Terminate > Maintain
where Renegotiate means renegotiating the stock option plan
with the employee so that she gets fewer stock options going
forward, or even perhaps also sells back some of her already
vested options to the company, but is not terminated; where
Terminate means terminating the employee under the at-will
doctrine, causing all of her unvested options to disappear; and
where Maintain means simply allowing the employee to
remain in her current arrangement, under which her stock

70. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2
71. Id.
72. See id.
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options will continue to vest over time. Suppose, on the other
hand, the employee’s preference ordering is
Maintain > Renegotiate > Terminate.
We may view the employer and employee as playing a
simple two-move game in which the employer moves first,
offering Renegotiate to the employee. The employee may
accept the offer and continue to work on the new terms, or
reject it and be terminated. Assuming the firm can credibly
signal that it prefers Terminate over Maintain, the rational
employee will accept renegotiation since she prefers that to
termination (as does her employer).
If the legal rule
prohibited this renegotiation, the firm would simply
terminate the employee, since it prefers Terminate to
Maintain. Thus, a Zygna clawback may be seen as reaching a
Pareto-superior outcome that could not be reached if
renegotiations were prohibited. It allows the firm to address
the employee moral hazard problem ex post.73
2. Adverse Selection
The startup firm also faces an adverse selection problem
in choosing employees.74 Prospective employees may realize
that their performance will be hard to monitor in the startup
firm. Routines will be fluid, the workplace atmosphere
informal, and much business done on a sort of honor system.75
The startup wants to attract a particular sort of
73. Some in the industry press saw the Zynga clawback in this light. See,
e.g., Mike Masnick, The Real ‘Scandal’ Over Zynga Stock Options Is Over
Misleading
Reporting,
TECHDIRT
(Nov.
18,
2011,
4:11
PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111118/04025616813/real-scandal-overzynga-stock-options-is-over-misleading-reporting.shtml.
What Zynga did here was take a few employees that it felt weren’t
achieving up to expectations and, rather just fire them—in which case
they would have received none of their unvested options—try to find
another role for them in the company. That other role, however, would
be somewhat lower on the totem pole, and thus, would be entitled to
fewer stock options. Yes, it’s basically a demotion, but for some people
perhaps that’s preferable to an outright firing.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
74. See Smith & King, supra note 57, at 14, for an overview of the adverse
selection problem.
75. Heffernan, supra note 66.
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entrepreneurial employee, which I discuss in more detail in
Part III.A below. But just as in biological systems where
parasites can sometimes invade a host by disguising
themselves as something other than what they really are, free
riders may present themselves as entrepreneurial employees
when they are really just looking for a setting in which their
underperformance will not be readily detected.76
Stock options not only incentivize performance but also
help identify the sort of employees the startup most wants to
hire.77 The willingness of a startup employee to accept stock
options in lieu of greater cash compensation sends a powerful
signal to the employer that the prospective employee shares
the founders’ entrepreneurial perception regarding the
startup’s significant opportunity for success, and that the
candidate is willing to join her economic fate to that of the
new company. In this way, startups can efficiently exploit
their resources by paying stock options to those prospective
employees who value them most. This high valuation is also
a serviceable proxy for an employee’s commitment and
enthusiasm for the startup project—traits startups value
highly in employees.78 Thus, offering stock options conserves
cash at the same time that it selects those employees who put
the highest value on the potential of the company.
In the best case, acceptance of startup options rather
than cash operates as a kind of specialized test to screen for
entrepreneurial acumen among prospective employees. A
new business faces many challenges that require a special
sort of judgment to overcome. A person may be more likely to
have this sort of judgment if she can see that the stock
options make a particular startup a better job opportunity
than another firm that pays more.

76. This is an instance of adverse selection by bad workers. See J. Hoult
Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 902–05.
77. Richard A. Booth, Give me Equity or Give Me Death - The Role of
Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J.
265, 275–76 (2007).
78. Id. at 275.
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B. Incomplete Contract Theory
The employer’s power to renegotiate the employment
contract also gives the employer the ability to behave
opportunistically.79 At the heart of this problem is the
costliness of objectively measuring the value of the
contribution a particular employee makes to the firm. This
measurement difficulty opens the door to both employee and
employer opportunism.80 It makes all but extreme shirking
by the employee difficult to catch while it is going on and
perhaps even afterwards. But it also makes it difficult to
disprove false accusations by the employer of employee
shirking. The absence of objective measures of employee
performance is a large part of what makes at-will
employment the default arrangement, but also what opens
the door to opportunism.81
This measurement difficulty also helps explain the
boundaries of the firm, a traditional preoccupation of
theorists of the firm since Coase.82 Where milestones are
readily identifiable, the startup will often hire independent
contractors to do a job.83 Independent contractors can be
awarded cash and stock options in exchange for the
achievement of specific milestones, about which the question

79. A commenter at Hacker News opined regarding the Zynga clawback:
I would argue it is a breach of the initial options agreement (at least in
spirit). Those shares were negotiated under a set of conditions—the
stock was very risky, and as a result worth very little. Now that
everything has turned out well, you can't go back and say, “Wait, I
didn't think it would be worth this much—give it back.”. Pincus
wouldn't be going back after a failed venture and forking over huge
amounts of cash to compensate for worthless stock, now, would he?
The option price and amount was set previously, and should be honored
as long as the employee is performing their duties reasonably.
This is greed in it’s [sic] simplest form.
damoncali,
Comment
on
HACKER
NEWS
(Nov.
10,
2011),
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3220147.
80. Heli C. Wang & Jay B. Barney, Employee Incentives to Make FirmSpecific Investments: Implications for Resource-Based Theories of Corporate
Diversification, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 466, 469–71 (2006).
81. Id. at 469.
82. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937).
83. See generally Christine Lagorio, How to Manage an Independent
Contractor, INC.COM (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.inc.com/guides/managingindependent-contractors.html (discussing the necessity of setting clear goals to
guide an independent contractor’s work).
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‘was the job satisfactorily completed?’ can be answered with a
yes or no.84 Not all jobs can be readily defined in this way,
however. Rather than contracting with someone outside the
firm, at-will employment within the firm combined with
vesting stock options is designed to produce incentivized
workers who can nevertheless be let go quickly if imperfect
monitoring suggests their performance is inadequate.
The ongoing employment of a worker in a startup subject
to the at-will doctrine causes stock options to vest but also
creates human capital that is specific to the startup and not
easily removed to another employer should the employee be
terminated. If a firm terminates an employee before she
earns her stock option grant, she loses this firm-specific
capital.85 Exposure to this penalty acts as a bond against
shirking, though at-will employment does not always act as a
bonding device because plenty of at-will employees, such as
those performing merely routine functions, are not
accumulating firm-specific human capital while they work.86
But for those employees who do, the risk that they could be
terminated at will and lose their firm-specific capital acts as a
deterrent against shirking and other forms of opportunism.87
1. Holdup Problems
The combination of the at-will doctrine and a stock option
plan as an employment regime is problematic because it
leaves the final decision of whether an employee is shirking
in the hands of the employer. Because the arrangement is at
will, the employee need not really be shirking or otherwise
inadequate in order for the firm to terminate her.88 For
example, a firm may lead an employee to believe, but not
contractually promise, that if she performs adequately and
the firm prospers, the firm will retain her long enough for her
stock options to vest. In reality, however, she could make her

84. Id.
85. See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 3.3.
86. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using
Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (explaining how
relational contracts rely on hostages or transaction-specific assets).
87. Id.
88. See Porter, supra note 29, at 63 (stating that employers can terminate
for no reason at all).
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most important contribution during her first eleven months
at the firm, and there would be nothing to stop her employer
from terminating her before any of her stock options vest.89
In fact, her employer may have an incentive to do so. The
employer might reason that however great her contribution
was during those eleven months, it is now irremovable from
the firm, and the firm can save significant dilution by firing
her before her stock options vest.90 Short of this, the
employer could also behave opportunistically by threatening
to terminate her, perhaps citing nonexistent shirking as a
negotiation tactic, and demand a contract renegotiation. The
firm sees the opportunity to avoid paying the employee what
it had informally (and not enforceably) agreed to pay her for a
contribution that she has already made to the firm and
cannot get back. This is the holdup problem emphasized by
incomplete contract theorists.91
89. See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 3.3.
90. A commenter at Hacker News observed: “I’ve seen people get cheated out
of compensation this way, in some cases where they took greatly reduced
salaries, in exchange for shares, but the shares vested, and after creating the
major innovation the company wanted, they were fired without cause before the
first vesting cliff.” nirvana, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock,
HACKER NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218774.
91. Leading articles addressing incomplete contracts literature include
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1119 (1990); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Benjamin Klein, Contracting
Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 367, 367–68 (1983); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); and Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978). As Smith and
King explain:
Where agency theory focuses on fitting compensation to particular
outcomes, incomplete contract theory focuses on decisionmaking
procedures and institutional design. This shift in focus is necessitated
by the assumption that all contracts are incomplete in the sense that
they do not specify the obligations of the contracting parties for all
potential outcomes.
The source of incompleteness is “bounded
rationality,” a somewhat malleable term that includes an inability to
negotiate future plans because parties “have to find a common
language to describe states of the world and actions with respect to
which prior experience may not provide much of a guide.” Thus,
bounded rationality might include an inability to write contracts in
such a way that they can be enforced by a third party.
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The classic illustration of the holdup problem involves a
supplier and a producer who could reach a Pareto-efficient
arrangement but do not because of the risk of strategic
behavior by one or both of the parties.92 So, for example,
imagine a firm, Widgetron, which makes widgets for sale and
needs to buy some specialized widget-making machines.93
Widget Machine Suppliers (WMS) could make these machines
for Widgetron, but to do so, it would have to invest in the
specialized equipment needed to make them. If WMS did
that, however, Widgetron would have increased bargaining
power.94 There are no other firms that want to buy widgetmaking machines. WMS might invest in building widgetmaking machines only to have Widgetron demand to
renegotiate the contract for buying the machines at a lower
price.95 Widgetron and WMS may not contract at all, or they
may have to engage in costly arrangements to make sure one
does not cheat the other.96 Widgetron may decide to acquire
the WMS firm or build its own division to do this work rather
than expose itself to holdups. What makes holdups possible
is asset specificity. If WMS commits itself to specific assets
(by buying widget-machine-making machines for example), it
exposes itself to holdup.97 A startup employee is in the same
Smith & King, supra note 57, at 17 (footnotes omitted).
92. Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43
J.L. & ECON. 105 (2000).
93. Cf. id. Klein tells the canonical but possibly apocryphal story of GM’s
acquisition of Fisher, the auto body manufacturer, to avoid holdup problems.
See id.
94. See id. at 117–18.
95. See id.
96. A nice example of the holdup problem I have witnessed involves what I
gather is a common practice among the burro drovers who assist climbers and
trekkers in the Andes. The burro drovers often negotiate one price at the
trailhead to move gear up into the mountains, but once the gear has been
packed on the animals and carried to a remote area, which is still a distance
from its ultimate destination, the drovers will demand a higher price. If no new
agreement is reached, the drovers will abandon the gear far from where
alternative drovers may be found, forcing the clients to carry the heavy gear
themselves and possibly to abandon their climb. The usual result is contract
renegotiation. Climbers can also attempt to renegotiate the contract once gear
has been delivered to its final destination and thus turn the tables of
opportunism. If climbers were to buy burros to carry gear into the high passes
instead of contracting for them, this would be an instance of vertical
integration. Klein, supra not 92, at 116–18.
97. See id. at 108.
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position if her contribution to the value of the firm is specific
and not spread evenly over the period during which her stock
options vest.
Holdup opportunities might be more of a problem for
startup firms than for other firms.
Startups are
entrepreneurial ventures that operate under conditions of
pervasive uncertainty.98 The standard four-year vesting
period is just a rough guess of how long an employee should
stay at a startup in order for the firm to get the most value
out of the employee. In a rapidly evolving market, an
employee might make any critical contributions she is going
to make in a matter of months or within a couple of years of
being hired. Pervasive uncertainty makes it impossible to
predict accurately.
Once early employees have made
whatever firm-specific contributions they are going to make
and can be replaced by employees who can perform more
routine work, the early employees are vulnerable to
Whether
opportunistic termination or renegotiation.99
renegotiation is actually opportunistic or not depends upon
the understandings on which the employee relied in accepting
the employment arrangement in the first place. If employees
make firm-specific contributions with the reasonable
expectation of being employed long enough for all or some
specific portion of their stock options to vest but are
terminated before that, as soon as their firm-specific
contributions are committed, the firm is later acting
opportunistically if it terminates the employees before their
options vest.
2. A Final Period Problem
Startups might be more likely to hold up employees
because startup firms are often founded with the purpose of
Established firms
achieving a major liquidity event.100
98. See generally Meghan Casserly, Understanding Employee Equity: Every
Statup’s Secret Weapon, FORBES.COM (Mar. 8, 2013, 5:30 PM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2013/03/08/understandingemployee-equity-bill-harris-sxsw/ (discussing the importance of using stock
options as part of a compensation package to conserve limited financial
resources).
99. Id.
100. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 994 (2006).
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operate according to routines that include repeat employment
transactions that they expect to conduct into the foreseeable
future.101 Startups, by contrast, hope they operate for a
relatively short period before an IPO or buyout is realized.102
This leads to what economists call a final period problem.103
A final period problem occurs when a repeated process comes
to an end.104 Incentives that may lead to cooperative behavior
tend to break down in a final period.105
Repeat transactions are important because they make
possible the enforcement and generation of norms.106 Norms
play an important role in constraining opportunistic behavior
in employment.
Labor economists report that it is
uncommon, even in settings where the at-will doctrine
prevails, for employers to terminate employees without
cause.107 The existence of these norms would seem mutually
beneficial to both firms and employees, and it is not
surprising that they have evolved.108 These norms allow
employees to rely on the incentives created by stock option
101. Id. at 1101.
102. Id. at 994.
103. See MARK HIRSCHEY, MANGERIAL ECONOMICS 559–60 (12th ed. 2009).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 560.
106. A classic study of evolved norms is Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115, 140 (1992) (“[G]eographical concentration, ethnic
homogeneity, and repeat dealing may be necessary preconditions to the
emergence of a contractual regime based on reputation bonds.”); see also
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (describing norm evolution among ranchers in Shasta County,
California).
See generally Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically
Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (explaining that Chinese middleman groups
reduce transaction costs and facilitate exchange in the absence of contract
laws). Venture capitalists may not be as ethnically homogenous as diamond
merchants, Chinese middlemen, or Shasta County ranchers, but they are
geographically concentrated and engage in repeat transactions. Besides, Silicon
Valley does not need ethnic homogeneity to achieve its tightly knit bubble
culture. See, e.g., Silicon Valley: Why Are Some People Reluctant to Move to the
Silicon Valley Despite It Making All Kinds of Sense?, QUORA,
http://www.quora.com/Silicon-Valley/Why-are-some-people-reluctant-to-moveto-the-Silicon-Valley-despite-it-making-all-kinds-of-sense (last visited Mar. 6,
2013).
107. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1920 (1996).
108. See id. at 1919.

SMITH FINAL

602

7/23/2013 9:26 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

plans and to make greater efforts for the benefit of the firm
than they would if they thought there was a substantial
chance that the firm would behave opportunistically. Firms
benefit from these efforts, but maintaining the option of firing
employees at will allows them greater flexibility to terminate
employees who do not live up to realistic expectations without
running the gauntlet of expensive wrongful termination
litigation.109
Depending on whether they respect these norms, firms
develop reputations as good or bad employers.
The
enforcement mechanism for these employment norms is not
so much legal as economic.110 A firm that repeatedly fired
employees before their options vested, even when their
performance was apparently satisfactory, would get a
reputation for being an opportunistic employer.111 In a labor
market that is highly competitive for the best talent, as
Silicon Valley and similar hubs are, this is a reputation firms
wish to avoid.112 If a firm plans to continue its operations into
the foreseeable future, a reputation as a reliable,
nonopportunistic employer is a critical asset to cultivate and
protect.
Norms arising out of reputational markets have
limitations though. The initial public offering (IPO) or an
acquisition by another entity (buyout) of a successful startup
potentially presents a different situation. An IPO or buyout
of a startup is the much hoped for liquidity event that allows
109. See Warren Martin, Comment, Employment at Will: Just Cause
Protection Through Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WASH. L. REV. 151, 161 (1987).
110. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 107, at 1919.
111. One commenter at Hacker News probably spoke for many when he
opined:
Silicon Valley isn’t a special place for invention and for startups
because of special infrastructure or special laws, but because of special
ideas and special norms. Those norms don't hold up in court, and they
erode a little bit every time someone like Pincus only thinks about
what they can get away with instead of what’s right. This reduces the
perceived value of equity for everyone in the valley, makes everyone
less open, less trusting, less willing to take a risk. In the end, we all
lose for that.
If I had my way, Pincus would never work in this town again. Anyone
involved in this decision should be made a pariah. If we don’t defend
the norms that make innovation possible, we'll lose them.
Cactus, supra note 1.
112. See generally id.
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founders and early investors to realize potentially large gains
on their early investments of entrepreneurial effort and
By their nature, these liquidity events are
capital.113
uncommon, even though many startups are founded in hopes
of attaining them.114 Startup founders and early investors
can become rich as a result of a successful IPO or buyout.
These exits are singular enough that few founders
probably think in terms of repeat company-founding
transactions,115 although rarely some founder–entrepreneurs
will have a series of successful exits with big liquidity
events.116 Because clawbacks can materially increase the
value of founder stock in an IPO or buyout by reducing
dilution,117 for most founder–entrepreneurs the benefit to be
gained from clawing back options from employees on the
verge of a liquidity event will outweigh any reputational
effect to be gained from complying with employment norms.118
Founder–entrepreneurs therefore have powerful financial
incentives to engage in clawbacks. These incentives are such
that approaching IPOs and buyouts can produce final period

113. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 100, at 994.
114. See generally id.
115. An important exception is venture capital firms, which are purpose-built
to invest serially with these exit scenarios in mind. See generally Ronald J.
Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070–76 (2003).
116. For descriptions of serial entrepreneurs, see Paul Gompers, Anna
Kovner, Josh Lerner & David Scharfstein, Performance Persistence in
Entrepreneurship, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 18 (2010).
117. See ANNA HUCULAK & DOV BEGUN, OSLER, HARKIN & HARCOURT LLP,
RESCUING
DROWNING
STOCK
OPTIONS
6
(2009),
available
at
http://www.osler.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Resources/Publications/EReviews/Corporate_Review/2009-06/17502_Rescuing_Drowning_Stock_
Options.pdf.
118. A commenter at Hacker News opined, “Founders only need to exit once.
There is surprisingly little incentive for a founder to avoid screwing over
employees.” ootachi, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock,
HACKER NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3220173.
But another commenter replied:
Spoken like a true non-founder... Reputation is everything. If a
founder ever wants to start a company again, screwing over employees
will haunt him in the long term much worse than any legal
repercussion that can be fixed with money. So I wager there is a lot
preventing founders from screwing employees, specially [sic] in
startups, where people are hyper connected.
Id.
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problems.119 These problems include opportunism toward
employees with significant unvested stock options.120
Employees may anticipate this opportunism and reduce their
effort accordingly, or take a different job.121
The risk of employer-side opportunism will likely be
greater where founder-entrepreneurs who do not anticipate
being repeat players are in control of the startup. This was
the case with Pincus and Zynga.122 Venture capital firms,
which are repeat players, are probably more motivated than
founder-entrepreneurs to conserve their reputations with
prospective startup employees. Venture capital firms are in
the business of funding and often managing startups, and
hiring the most talented employees they can find is a critical
part of building a successful startup.123 This suggests that
startups controlled by their founders, as Zynga was, rather
than by venture capitalists, are more likely to engage in
119. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 216–17 (3d ed.
2000) (describing final period problems).
120. See generally id. at 216.
121. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 119, at 216–17 (discussing tit-for-tat
opportunism with employers and employees as their relationship comes to an
end).
122. Pincus’s ownership position before the IPO is described in the IPO
prospectus as follows:
The total number of shares of our Class A, Class B and Class C
common stock reflected in the discussion and tables above is based on
no shares of our Class A common stock, 562,466,698 shares of our Class
B common stock (including preferred stock on an as converted basis)
and 20,517,472 shares of our Class C common stock outstanding, as of
March 31, 2011 . . . .
....
From our inception in October 2007 to date, Mr. Pincus, our Chief
Executive Officer, Chief Product Officer and the Chairman of our Board
of Directors, has purchased an aggregate of 149,197,328 shares of our
common stock. To date, Mr. Pincus has sold an aggregate of 43,629,310
shares of our common stock at prices ranging from $0.42 to $13.96. In
addition to sales by Mr. Pincus, our other current and former executive
officers and employees have sold an aggregate of 51,192,501 shares of
our capital stock at prices ranging from $0.25 to $17.09 per share,
including, 6,717,161 shares we repurchased from our other executive
officers and employees. These sales include two tender offers in 2010
by third parties in which 383 employees were eligible to participate and
298 employees decided to participate and sell shares.
Zynga Inc., Registration Statement Form S-1, 40, 123 (July 1, 2011), available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1439404/000119312511180285/ds1
.htm.
123. See Gilson, supra note 115, at 1068.
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apparently opportunistic clawbacks.
The seriousness of the threat of employer opportunism in
startups, where employees must create firm-specific capital
as quickly as possible if they are to succeed, helps explain the
existence of venture capital firms. Venture capital firms are
not just investment firms, but also management firms.124
Venture capital firms are relatively undiversified and
specialized repeat players in the niche market of new
technology-intensive startups, and they take active roles in
the management of their portfolio firms.125 This peculiar
arrangement allows venture capital firms to develop
reputations not only for their investment acumen but also for
Venture capital firms can
their management styles.126
leverage their reputation for actively managing portfolio
firms in the short- and long-term to serve as a bond against
opportunistic employment practices by the startups in which
the venture capital firm invests.127 These firms may exist
partly because they can serve as a reliable protector of the
interests of employees against the opportunism of founderentrepreneurs. Venture capitalists have more skin in the
long game.
Bonding devices such as venture-capitalist reputation
may provide some reassurance to prospective employees who
may otherwise be inclined to discount heavily option-based
startup employment offers because of the risk of employer
opportunism. Incomplete contract theory suggests bonding
124. See id. at 1072.
125. See id.
126. Venture capital firms might be considered reputational intermediaries
as described in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
Investment banks are
reputational intermediaries who vouch for the issuers who sell securities with
the help of the bank’s intermediation. Venture capital firms take an active part
in startup firm management, but they do play something like a reputational
intermediary role in the labor market. The venture capital firm’s role in
management acts to underwrite the reputation of the startup as employer, or
possibly for some venture capital firms, to undermine it. Id.
127. See William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist
Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879, 880 (1991) (arguing that
venture capitalists play a certification role in initial public offerings). I suggest
here they provide a kind of employer certification. Established companies
(Google, IBM, etc.) have a reputation that acts as a bond against opportunistic
termination, to a degree. Startups rent, one could say, the venture capital
firm’s reputation for the same purpose.
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mechanisms will evolve to address holdup problems.128
Agency theory suggests incentive devices such as stock
options will be used to align the interests of employees,
Startup stock
entrepreneur-founders, and investors.129
options go beyond stock options in established companies,
which also align incentives, by having a popular and not
undeserved reputation for potentially being a source of great
riches. We turn now to look at how this special aspect of this
compensatory device may help address contracting problems.
III. COMPENSATING ENTREPRENEURIAL EMPLOYEES
Frank Knight observed that an important aspect of
entrepreneurial judgment is the ability to judge the
capabilities of others,130 and this is especially apt for startups.
Startup founders must make entrepreneurial judgments
when they hire employees, and the imponderability131 of the
traits they are looking for increases the risk of moral hazard
and adverse selection. To manage this risk, some successful
startups, such as Google, invest heavily in screening new
hires, to a degree that appeared extraordinary to more
established industries.132 This approach makes sense if one
considers that firms exploring new product and market
spaces are likely to require unusual degrees of intelligence,
adaptivity, and creativity from their employees, and that the
lack of these skills may prove especially costly in
entrepreneurial firms.

128. Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms
Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 191, 208–09 (2009).
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 241–42 (1921).
Knight writes:
Men differ in their capacity by perception and inference to form correct
judgments as to the future course of events in the environment. This
capacity, furthermore, is far from homogeneous, some persons excelling
in foresight in one kind of problem situations, others in other kinds, in
almost endless variety. Of especial importance is the variation in the
power of reading human nature, of forecasting the conduct of other
men, as contrasted with scientific judgment in regard to natural
phenomena.
Id.
131. Or unobservability.
132. See LEVY, supra note 7, passim (discussing Google’s recruiting
strategies).
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Startups compensate employees by combining lower
salaries than they could get at more established companies
with substantial stock option grants.133 These stock options
must be valuable to employees because they accept them as
reasons to turn down larger cash offers. What are we to
make of this?
A startup stock option package is in some ways like a
lottery ticket in that it gives the holder a chance of a large
financial windfall. Calculating the value of a stock option,
however, is much more complex than calculating the value of
a lottery ticket. In the case of a hypothetical lottery ticket,
one can simply multiply the inverse of the number of tickets
outstanding by the promised prize to get the expected value of
the ticket. So if a million tickets will be sold in a fair lottery
for a $1 million prize, each ticket has an expected value of
1/1,000,000 times $1 million, or $1.
Calculating the value of an option requires a more
complex formula. Under the Black-Scholes option-pricing
model, a number of factors determine the value of a call
option.134 According to this formula, the greater the positive
change in the price of the underlying share, the more the
right to buy it at a fixed price—the stock option—will be
worth.135 The stock option granted to the employee by the
startup has a positive-speculation value when it is granted,
even before it vests, because there is a nonzero probability
that the underlying stock will attain a value greater than the
exercise price of the option before it expires.
So a
hypothetical call option on startup stock with an exercise
price of $1 has speculative value if there is a possibility that
the stock will attain some value greater than $1 before the
option expires. Intuitively, the reason a stock option has
value when granted is because there is value to be had even
in the small probability of a valuable outcome. In this sense,
stock options are like lottery tickets—they have value before
the drawing because they represent a probabilistic
expectation of future value.

133. Bankman, supra note 55, at 1750.
134. See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options
and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
135. See id. at 640–45.
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Some of the present value of unvested stock options
comes from the possibility that the price of the underlying
stock will reach improbably high levels, as they might after a
very successful IPO.136 In terms of present value, however,
this amount is likely to be modest because the probability of a
successful IPO, let alone a spectacular one, is small in
absolute terms.137 It seems likely that the modest expected
value of stock options when granted is not a large part of
what prospective startup employees are bargaining for when
they choose to work for an entrepreneurial startup rather
than an established firm. Even with the present value of
startup stock option packages included, established
companies probably offer higher salaries than startups.138
Startups must therefore offer something more to their
employees that is not captured by the modest present values
of their stock option packages combined with cash salaries.
This something more is not well captured by conventional
microeconomic models, which assume individuals are riskaverse utility maximizers.139 State lottery authorities exploit
this deviation of actual human behavior from conventional
microeconomics to raise billions of dollars for state treasuries
each year.140 A lottery ticket might have an expected value of
less than the $1 it sells for because it represents, say, a one in
more-than-one-million chance to win $1 million. A rational,
risk-neutral, or risk-averse person should not be willing to
pay $1 for such a ticket. Yet millions of people are more than
willing to buy chances of this kind.141 Why they do this is
A plausible
something of a puzzle for economists.142
explanation is that lottery tickets are different from other
negative-expected-value investments because they represent
the real, if remote possibility for buyers of attaining great
136. See generally id.
137. Less than two percent of startups make it to IPO. Ben Livson, BAL
CONSULTING P/L, VALUATION OF STARTUPS, 6 (2009), available at
http://www.bal.com.au/valuations.pdf.
138. Bankman, supra note 55, at 1750.
139. See generally RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES
AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63–78 (1992).
140. See Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It
Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71, 108–109.
141. See generally id. at 75–80.
142. See id.
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wealth, while risking only what the lottery ticket buyer
believes he can afford to lose.
This phenomenon has a parallel in the startup world.
Some prospective employees probably agree to work for
startups for a combination of salary and stock options, the
combined present value of which is less than they could get at
established companies, for reasons similar to why people buy
lottery tickets—because of the possibility, even if remote, that
the stock options will make them wealthy. In this view, it is
precisely the possibility of becoming a Google chef that
entices entrepreneurially minded workers to work for startup
ventures that have a small but real possibility of making
them rich. By saying they wanted to avoid a Google chef
situation, Zynga’s managers were getting things backwards.
In the startup world, one could say, almost everybody wants
to be, if not a Google founder, at least a Google chef.
A. Who Are Entrepreneurial Employees?
There is an important difference between the
entrepreneurial startup worker and the lottery ticket buyer,
however. The lottery ticket buyer is just gambling. He is
hoping that a random number generator will come up with
the number he just happens to have chosen or had assigned
to him. Choosing a startup to work for is by contrast a game
of skill, at least in part. When a prospective employee decides
to accept a job offer from a particular startup, she is making
an entrepreneurial judgment. One standard method of
decision making would have the prospective employee
compare these two offers and choose the one with the greater
present value. Yet faced with this choice, the prospective
employee chooses the startup. Why? A prospective employee
who chooses to work for a startup that offers an employment
package with a lower expected value, but with a subjectively
more attractive stock option package than she would get at an
established company, may have either or a combination of
two motives. The first I call an “entrepreneurial motive” and
the second a “gambling motive.”
In most instances, the entrepreneurial motive is probably
more important. When a prospective employee, E, decides to
take the lower paying job with a startup, she is making an
entrepreneurial investment or bet in the startup company
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with a portion of her total human capital. Intuitively, her
total human capital may be seen as the present value of the
maximum income stream she could produce with her human
capital, by working for an established company. Suppose that
the present expected value of the most E could earn over the
next four years is $400,000, and that this would, by
hypothesis, come from working for an established company at
about $100,000 per year to be paid to her in a cash salary.
Alternatively, if E decided to work instead for four years for a
startup for nothing but stock options, she could be said to be
making an investment of her $400,000 in human capital in
the startup in exchange for the options. If E decides, as is
more typical, to work for a startup for a cash salary lower
than she could get from an established company, then her
investment is equal to the opportunity cost of her decision.
The opportunity cost is the difference between the present
value of her total compensation at the startup and the
present value of what her total compensation would have
been at the her best available alternative, here an established
company.
It may be that the prospective employee makes a
judgment that the stock option package offered by the startup
is actually more valuable than it would be judged to be worth
by a more objective observer, such as an appraisal firm or a
bank, applying a standard valuation methodology. The
prospective employee may make a higher valuation judgment
for a number of reasons. She may have information that the
capital market at large does not have because of her
specialized technical background. She may have tried the
startup’s product personally and developed a conviction that
it is going to be a disruptive force in its market. The
prospective employee may appreciate the talent of team
members already working for the startup, or developments
that she believes are likely to be coming in the relevant
market, more than does the capital market generally. In
short, she knows better than the market.143 Startup founders
143. See
generally
ISRAEL
M.
KIRZNER,
COMPETITION
AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY
AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1979). For a
summary of Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship, see ROBERT F. HÉBERT &
ALBERT N. LINK, THE ENTREPRENEUR: MAINSTREAM VIEWS AND RADICAL
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frequently take care to keep information about their products,
technology, and market plans private, revealing such
information only to prospective employees and investors, and
This
then only subject to nondisclosure agreements.144
information may lead the prospective employee to decide that
despite what other—arguably more objective, but less
informed, or less perceptive—evaluators may think, the total
compensation package from the startup has a higher present
value than the compensation package offered by the
established company. The investment of her labor in the
startup is entrepreneurial in the sense that she perceives an
opportunity where others do not.
B. Gambling Employees
Part of the reason some employees choose to work for
startups, when they could earn a bigger salary working for an
established firm, may be that they enjoy taking risks. Many
people gamble for fun.145
Gambling is different from entrepreneurship. Invoking
Israel Kirzner’s conception, one may see entrepreneurship as
perceiving (or thinking one perceives) an opportunity that the
market generally does not (because if the market had already
incorporated the opportunity, it would no longer exist). An
entrepreneur may perceive that railroad cars may double as
shipping containers on properly designed ships, reducing
shipping costs, and creating profit opportunities.146 Or that
packages may be shipped more efficiently through central

CRITIQUES 132–34 (2d ed. 1988); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE
MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN
ECONOMICS (1992); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST
PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM
(1963).
144. William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to
Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 70–71
(2001).
145. See Renee M. Cunningham-Williams et al., Prevalence and Predictors of
Pathological Gambling: Results from the St. Louis Personality, Health and
Lifestyle (SLPHL) Study, 39 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 377, 378 (2005) (finding that
more than eighty percent of the U.S. population gambles at some time in their
lives).
146. See, e.g., Hugh L. Randall et al., Railroad Operational Panel, 28
TRANSP. L.J. 447, 456–57 (2001).
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hubs.147 The entrepreneur perceives an opportunity and
enters the market to realize the opportunity. Gambling,
strictly speaking, is different. In roulette, for example, there
is no better chance that a red number will come up than a
black number.148 A gambler engages in pure speculation,
merely hoping he has guessed right that the next spin will
produce the sort of number he has chosen. There is no
pretense here of perceiving more accurately than anyone else
where the ball will stop. Many people find betting on these
guesses entertaining, and taking stock options in lieu of cash
from a startup may appeal to some simply as an opportunity
to play the odds.149 Taking pay in stock options can also mix
entrepreneurial investment and gambling in an interesting
way.
C. Mixed Games and Leveraged Rewards
Some games test both a player’s superior powers of
opportunity perception and his luck.
Business
entrepreneurship is surely one of these. Most successful
entrepreneurs will concede that luck played a significant role
in their success, though some are more willing than others to
give Fortuna her due.150 Entrepreneurs must bear the risk
not only that they are wrong about the existence of a
profitable opportunity but also the risk that however good
their idea may be, something unforeseen may go wrong, or
that in order for the business to prosper, something

147. See Stuart Auerbach, Big Delivery Firms Maneuver for Position:
Companies Striving for Bigger Share of Busy Washington Market, WASH. POST,
Jan. 18, 1988, at F1; see also Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?:
The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005).
148. Don Baker, Roulette, 91 MATHEMATICS TCHR. 743, 818 (1998).
149. Vince Martin, Using Stock Options to Gamble on Gambling Stocks,
CalvinAyre.com (Mar. 26, 2012), http://calvinayre.com/2012/03/26/business/
investing-the-hard-way-using-stock-options-gamble-on-gambling-stocks/.
150. Compare 10 Questions for Ken Hendricks, INC. (Dec. 1, 2006),
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20061201/entrepreneur-questions.html
(“The
most overrated skill is skill. Luck is more important. The entrepreneur gets
credit for being this genius, when really he was just at the right place at the
right time.”), with John W. Rogers, Separating Luck From Skill, FORBES.COM
(Nov. 13, 2009, 2:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/1130/financecarnival-ariel-basketball-patient-investor.html (“[O]ver time, skill shines
through as luck evens out.” (quoting MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN, THINK TWICE:
HARNESSING THE POWER OF COUNTERINTUITION 123 (2009))).
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unforeseen must go right. How much of a business success
should be attributed to entrepreneurial genius and how much
to luck, however, is rarely clear.
This ambiguity creates the opportunity for the lucky
person to leverage his luck into the appearance of genius. He
may wish to do this because entrepreneurial geniuses have
more prestige than the merely lucky. One may envy lottery
winners, but one both envies and admires entrepreneurial
geniuses. This leveraging opportunity is another enticement
of working for a startup that may attract some prospective
employees. This ambiguity has a value that is part of what
the high risk startup can offer prospective employees. The
prospective employee may in truth have no idea whether the
venture will succeed or not. But if it does, and he becomes
rich, those who attribute his fortune purely to luck will
merely appear envious. Thus a startup presents, to some, the
opportunity to play a kind of lottery where the winner gets to
claim, not his luck, but his judgment was rewarded.
Furthermore, it takes courage to bet on one’s judgments. The
winner of a startup lottery gets credit for being both smart
and brave as measured in units that are legal tender for
every visible signal of success. These bragging rights might
seem a trivial benefit, but one must consider that in the high
technology startup realm the employees firms seek out tend
to come from ferociously competitive disciplines and fields of
study. Elite mathematicians, scientists, and engineers are
notorious for loving competitions in which they pit their
brainpower against one another. The opportunity of a great
financial windfall would be less appealing to them if it did not
also represent a way, if not to prove, then to at least plausibly
claim superior intellect as well.
D. Big Prizes
The appeal of big prizes scarcely needs to be explained. If
prizes are big enough, they hold out the prospect of being life
transforming.151 Startup stock option packages offer the
151. “The gargantuan [prizes] and lilliputian [odds of winning] of lotto games
make apparent what they are fundamentally about—the consumer is sacrificing
the probability of winning for the possibility of an enormous payoff.” Lloyd R.
Cohen, The Lure of the Lottery, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 714 (2001). “The
lottery ticket is an input into the dream of wealth. A dream of wealth will only
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prospect of such big prizes.
If a startup achieves a
spectacular IPO or buyout, employee stock options can turn
into significant personal fortunes, the kind that can finance a
life that eschews ordinary work and delves into the further
reaches of personal fulfillment and indulgence. Google chef
Ayers realized his dream and opened his own restaurant.152
Other beneficiaries of successful startups have bought houses,
jets, yachts, sport teams, elaborate world tours, and the list
goes on and on.153 Former startup employees often strike out
on their own entrepreneurial ventures or turn to personal
scientific, philanthropic or other rewarding if not
remunerative pursuits.154 The prospect of wealth on this lifechanging scale has a special appeal that goes beyond the
modest present expected value of the chance to get it.
Startups know this and entice employees with the prospect of
wealth beyond anything they could earn working for a
company whose growth has already plateaued.
IV. CAN STARTUP EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS BE
IMPROVED?
The combination of at-will employment and stock options
is well established among startups as the preferred mode for
employing nonfounder, non-C-level employees.155 Can it be
improved? Does it need to be? Is there an approach that
be liberating to the extent that one believes that it will fundamentally
transform one’s life.” Id. at 730.
152. See Lynn Andriani, Finding Google: A Chef’s Story, CNNMONEY (Sept.
30, 2008, 9:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/smallbusiness/tastes_of
_google.fsb/index.htm.
153. See generally Jennifer Booton, Facebook’s Overnight Millionaires Begin
Lavish
Spending
Spree,
FOX
BUSINESS
(May
18,
2012),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2012/05/18/facebook-overnightmillionaires-start-luxurious-spending-spree/; Glenn Hellman, A Startup
Founder’s
Holiday
Wish
List,
STARTUP
AMERICA
PARTNERSHIP,
www.s.co/content/startup-founder’s-holiday-wish-list (last visited April 27,
2013); Mallory Ortberg, Homeland Security Took Michael Arrington’s Boat
Because ‘America Is Myspace,’ GAWKER.COM (Feb. 23, 2013, 12:09 PM),
http://gawker.com/5986416/homeland-security-took-michael-arringtons-boatbecause-america-is-myspace.
154. See, e.g., Alex Knapp, Billionaires to Announce New Space Startup Next
Week, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp
/2012/04/19/billionaires-to-announce-new-space-startup-next-week/.
155. Nalin Kulatilaka & Alan J. Marcus, Valuing Employee Stock Options, 50
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 1, 46 (1994).
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would overall be better for both employees and startups? If
Zynga clawbacks become more common and startups
encounter more difficulty hiring the employees they want,
then the answers might all be yes. On the other hand, the
Zynga clawback might be an outlier unlikely to be repeated,
the product of a particularly aggressive founder,156 especially
disappointing employees within a company that was
approaching a highly anticipated IPO, or both. Or it may be
that the Zynga clawback is symptomatic of a deeper problem
that will threaten to emerge whenever a founderentrepreneur-controlled firm approaches a large payoff.
In this section, I propose a modification to the standard
arrangement that employees and startups could adopt that
would alleviate some of the problems revealed by the Zynga
clawback. The basic idea of the proposal is that, at the time
of hiring, the employee and the startup firm negotiate a
buyback right that would give the firm the right to buy back
prior to a liquidity event all (or some) of the employee’s
unvested (or unexercised) stock options at a price agreed on
when the employee is hired. The firm would be able to
exercise this right during some set period of time before an
IPO or buyout, such as six or twelve months. During this
same period, however, the firm would be contractually bound
not to terminate the employee without cause, unless it
exercised its option to buy back the options at the agreed
156. See generally Peter Jamison, Former Zynga Employees Talk About
Copying Games for Mark Pincus’ ‘Evil’ Online Empire, SF WEEKLY (Sept. 7,
2010, 5:32 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2010/09/zynga_pincus_copy
_games.php. Jamison writes:
Pincus is a deeply controversial figure, and internal documents reveal
that he’s not just the subject of griping among his workers. A
confidential memo produced for the venture-capital firm Kleiner
Perkins Caufield & Byers, a major early Zynga investor, expressed
reservations about Pincus’ management style. “Mark needs strong
lieutenants to keep him from micromanaging,” stated the document,
which was obtained by SF Weekly.
The former senior employee who says he was present for Pincus’ “No
Innovation” speech jokingly sums up Zynga’s corporate ethos as an
inversion of Google's famous “Don't Be Evil” motto. “Zynga’s motto is
‘Do Evil,’ ” he says. “I would venture to say it is one of the most evil
places I've run into, from a culture perspective and in its business
approach. I've tried my best to make sure that friends don't let friends
work at Zynga.”
Id.
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price. The provision could also allow the firm to buy back the
options without terminating the employee. The buyback
price, it is envisioned, would represent an ex ante estimate of
how much the stock options would be worth if they vested
before a liquidity event that represented a reasonably
successful exit for the investors, but not a spectacular
success.
This proposal is motivated partly by the belief that the
Zynga clawback is not some freakish anomaly but is more
likely the result of predictable biases in human behavior.
Empirical studies (as well as common experience) suggest
that people tend to overestimate the value of their own
contributions to joint projects.157 Similarly, it seems likely
that founder-entrepreneurs will tend to underestimate the
value of employees’ contributions to firm value given that the
larger the estimate the founder makes of an employee’s value,
the less the founder will himself be getting from an IPO or
buyout. For the reasons discussed above, entrepreneurial
founders, as well as employees, especially prize large payoffs.
This aggravates what is essentially a pie-division problem.158
The current structure of startup compensation invites
renegotiation of how the pie is to be divided just as a large
payoff looms on the horizon.
These are the very
circumstances likely to lead to feelings of aggrievement by
employees if their options are clawed back, and by founders if
they are not. That employees and founders should reach an
agreement under these circumstances that leaves all parties
feeling they have received what they are entitled to seems
almost a psychological impossibility.
A. Contract as a Reference Point
A better approach might be available. One way to look at
the problem is suggested by the recent work of economists

157. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive
Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 46–50 (Kenneth J.
Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining
Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109,
119–21 (1997).
158. See generally H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1994); Hugo Steinhaus, The Problem of Fair Division, 16 ECONOMETRICA 101
(1948).
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Hart and Moore on contracts as reference points.159 Their
intuition, crudely summarized, is that if parties get at time
one what they already agreed they would get when they made
their contract at time zero, then they will not feel
aggrieved.160 This will enable them to go forward in their
contractual relationship without shading. Shading is what
Hart and Moore call the merely perfunctory performance one
would expect out of an aggrieved employee who feels her
employer has treated her badly.161 Hart and Moore assume
perfunctory performance would comply with the contract
strictly speaking, and so give rise to no legal remedy, but
would be less than the consummate performance the
employer hopes for.162
A simple analogy may help here. Imagine your neighbor
is getting his house painted. It turns out you like the color he
has chosen, and the painters inadvertently bought too much
paint for that job. You realize the cost to them of painting
your house, given that they already have the paint (which
cannot be resold because it has already been mixed to its
particular hue) would be only $1000. Normally, you would
have to pay $5000 to get your house painted, and that is also
the value to you of the job. You and the painters agree that
they should paint your house, and you put off agreeing on the
price until they are finished, or nearly so. When it comes
time to settle up, however, the entirely predictable happens—
the parties disagree on the fair price.
The homeowner declares that $1000 is the fair price.
This covers the cost of the labor (let us assume there was no
opportunity cost for the job; the painters would otherwise
have been idle) and the paint had already been paid for and
would have been wasted had it not been used on your house.
The painters declare with equal justice that the price should
be $5000. This is the fair market value of the work done, and
what the homeowner would have had to pay if he had gone to
another crew.

159.
160.
161.
162.

See generally Hart & Moore, supra note 24, passim.
Id. at 5–6.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 3, 6.
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Contract law scholars may want to argue here over
whether a court should award the painters on the basis of
their reliance cost ($1000) or under restitution ($5000),163 but
that is not the point here. Both parties sensibly realize that
litigation costs would eat up any gain they are likely to get by
insisting on their way. The parties agree to settle on a price
between $1000 and $5000, say, $2500. But here is the point:
even though the parties agree on this settlement, they both
feel aggrieved by the result.
This means the ongoing
relationship of the parties will not be optimal. Paint jobs are
often not really over when the painters leave the site—missed
spots will be noticed, equipment may be left behind, and
usually there are understandings that painters will return to
take care of these problems—but that is not the case here
because the painters are aggrieved. The homeowner will pay,
but only at the last moment, and will not offer a good
reference and may even put it about that the painters should
be avoided. Hart and Moore provide a mathematical model of
these costs, and show that the costs of aggrievement are
deadweight losses and prevent parties from attaining the
maximum benefit of their exchange.164
Parties can avoid aggrievement costs by using the
contract to set a reference point from the outset, as Hart and
Take an alternative scenario: the
Moore explain.165
homeowner and the painters agree ex ante on a price of
$2500. When the job is finished, the homeowner pays
promptly. The painters leave, but come back to touch up and
collect items left behind. The homeowner provides a positive
reference. The value of the exchange is maximized.166
The at-will-plus-stock-options employment arrangement
used by startups has problems similar to those of other
employment contracts where the price paid for services is
negotiated (or renegotiated) after the services have been
rendered. In the startup setting, the problem may arise if the
liquidity event is unexpectedly large.
The founderentrepreneur may have anticipated a more normal liquidity
163. See generally Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755, 1755–67.
164. See Hart & Moore, supra note 24, at 8–13.
165. See id. at 2.
166. See id. at passim.
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event and calculated the expected cost of various employees
in those terms. A larger than expected liquidity event,
however, changes the implicit cost (in absolute terms) of
employees. Google founders may have realized, for example,
that they had inadvertently agreed to pay their chef more
than $4 million per year. Especially when they realized some
of this money was coming from them personally, the founders
might have felt aggrieved, especially if they estimated, as
human bias makes likely, that the cook’s contribution was
less valuable than what his options turned out to be worth.
Google founders did not attempt (as far as I know) to
renegotiate Ayers’s option package, but they probably could
have had they chosen to. Zynga did renegotiate option
packages, and other startups may do the same as they
approach big liquidity events. Even where firms do not
renegotiate option packages, this may cloak feelings of
aggrievement
among firms
that feel they have
overcompensated employees, and lead to shading by firms.
Using the employment contract as a reference point would
ameliorate these problems.
We may use an alternative history of the Google chef to
illustrate. If Ayers had worked for Google and had some of
his options clawed back, he might have continued to work for
the company afterwards, but he might have felt aggrieved
and his cooking may have suffered. On the other hand, if the
firm had not clawed back any of his options, Page, Brin, and
other controlling shareholders might have been unable to
enjoy his fare as they calculated in their heads how many
thousands of dollars each meal was costing them and felt
aggrieved about it. This sour dilemma arises when the actual
compensation a startup employee gets is not really negotiated
in advance because the clawback door is left unlocked and
most likely won’t be opened until a big liquidity event is
looming.
Suppose instead the buyback option proposed here was
written into Ayers’s stock option plan and Ayers’s stock
options were subject to a buyback right at a total price of, say,
$8 million. This would be the amount Ayers agreed to when
he accepted his job at the company. As a spectacular IPO
approached, the firm would buy back his options for $8
million, much less than he would have gotten without the
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buyback, but a big windfall nonetheless, enough for Ayers to
start his own restaurant. The Google chef would have no
reason to feel aggrieved and neither would his employer. If
$8 million did not seem like a big enough prize to be worth
the cut in pay the chef would take to work at the startup, he
could bargain for more ex ante.
This proposal suggests a buyback term that would be in
effect for one year prior to defined liquidity events, such as
IPOs and buyouts. To be effective, this term would need to
have flip-in rights that would be triggered after the fact, in
the event an employee was terminated and then within one
year after the startup had an IPO or buyout.167 This would
obviously and significantly limit the power of the firm to
terminate employees without cause in the period before a
liquidity event. In the event of an unanticipated transaction,
such as an unexpected buyout from an acquirer that appeared
suddenly on the scene, the rights of terminated employees
would resurface and have the effect of diluting the equity of
existing shareholders.
Hiring an employee with the sort of protective buyback
provision proposed here would obviously be more expensive to
the firm than hiring without it. Whether this cost would be
justified would depend on whether the firm anticipated that
167. By flip-in rights, I mean rights to sell unvested options back to the
issuing firm at a set price that would be triggered by a liquidity event that
occurred within six or twelve months (or some other period, as negotiated) after
the termination date of the employee. Suzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill
Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 424 (1987). Thus certain rights
pertaining to the stock options would have to survive termination. The stock
option plan would have to be drafted to provide for this, but this presents no
insuperable drafting issues. The proposal may be overbroad in that it would
cover employees who were terminated nonopportunistically pre-IPO or buyout,
but this could be mitigated by allowing for the for-cause termination not
triggering the rights of employees, as in these cases an employee was actually
failing to perform to reasonable expectations. What would seem difficult or
perhaps impossible would be to have an employment arrangement that both
enabled, as under current law, an employer to terminate without cause before a
liquidity event, without having to take any steps to substantiate inadequate
performance, and at the same time, substantial limits to the scope of possible
employer opportunism. Essentially, curtailing the freedom that an employer
enjoys under at-will doctrine to some degree seems necessary if one wants to
reduce the scope of possible employer opportunism before liquidity events.
Whether this cost to the employer is justified depends on how valuable this
term would be to a potential employee and how this value would be shared
between employer and employee.
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the benefits of assuring prospective employees against
employer opportunism would be greater. No doubt some
prospective employees would not have the bargaining power
to insist on such a protective provision and would accept
options subject to a clawback provision. C-level employees,
such as star CEOs that startups sometimes hire, often
negotiate severance packages that guarantee them certain
benefits, including stock options, should they be terminated
before a certain term.168 The proposal here is envisioned as a
middle-ground level of protection that would be more than
non-C-level employees currently get but less than what star
C-level employees frequently negotiate.
My proposal deserves consideration because there is no
clear reason why the best and brightest prospective startup
employees should not be worried about Zynga clawbacks. The
fact is that however attractive the stock option packages that
startups dangle before them may be, as the law stands now,
startups can attempt to renegotiate them in anticipation of a
particularly successful IPO or buyout. Employees then will
be left in the unenviable position of either accepting a
diminished option package or getting fired. They can sue, but
the law is not on their side. At-will employment, although
unloved by law professors, is still the law in California and
most other states.169 Such employment relationships allow an
employer to fire an employee without reason, and a withoutcause termination will render worthless any unvested stock
the employee may have.
While repeat-player venture
capitalists have good reason to avoid the reputational hit that
opportunistic-seeming option renegotiations might inflict on
their reputations as fair-minded managers of portfolio
companies, founder-entrepreneurs who are about to become
billionaires do not have the same incentives. For them,
option renegotiations take place in something much more like
a final period, and the options they claw back will go to make
less diluted their stake and those of other founders and early
investors. Doing this will have a cost for the firm in terms of
aggrieved employees, but the founders may figure that the

168. Jonathan M. Ocker & Gregory C. Scheck, Employment Agreements for
New Economy Chief Executives, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 21, 22 (2000).
169. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (2012).
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most creative phase of those employees who will be aggrieved
is past anyway. Founders deciding whether to claw back
options inevitably will be making biased judgments,
comparing the value of their own contributions to those of
employees to whom they wish they had given less. All of this
is foreseeable, and the best and brightest of prospective
startup employees are smart enough to foresee it, especially
with the Zynga clawback having served as a precedent. They
may want some protection against this contingency.
The buyback commitment has some disadvantages for
the firm.
Terminating employees could not so easily
replenish option pools.170 Accounting rules would probably
require that options of terminated employees be treated as
outstanding for the period during which they could still flip-in
in the event a liquidity event occurred.171 Rational employers
would want to invest more in screening techniques before
they hired any employees who would not be so easily
terminated.
But there would be benefits for the firm as well.
Especially prized prospects might be more likely to accept
offers from firms that offered option buyback protection. On
the other hand, even just offering the option of buyback
protection would give the prospective hire the opportunity to
reject the offer and thereby signal that she was so confident
that she would be of ongoing value to the firm that she did
not want to trade the possibility of an especially spectacular
windfall for protection against opportunism. It is also the
case that buybacks might operate to the firm’s benefit by
taking advantage of the difficulty most people have in
calculating the utility to them of large sums of money. So
how likely is it that an employee about to be hired for an
annual salary of $90,000 per year would much distinguish
between two otherwise equal jobs, one of which was subject to
a $50 million option buyback provision, and the other, to a
$100 million provision? Most people in that position would
170. See generally Ryan Roberts, What is an Option Pool?, STARTUP LAWYER
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://startuplawyer.com/stock-options/what-is-an-option-pool
(explaining stock option pools in startup firms).
171. See Robert J. Friedman et al., Executive Compensation, in 2 CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK: 2011–12, at 1043, 1086 (Christopher A. Myers &
Kwamina Thomas Williford, eds., 2011).
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probably find it difficult to imagine that their lives would be
much different with the extra $50 million, the first $50
million having provided enough to leapfrog out of the usual
trials of working for a living.172 Yet this $50 million in stock
that the company did not have to issue to an employee could
make a material difference for the founders and investors of a
startup firm on the eve of a spectacular IPO, especially when
one considers that the equity positions of a number of
employees could be similarly capped.
Whether an option buyback term would act as a reference
point depends on there being a substantial psychological
difference to both employer and employee between options
getting clawed back and options being bought back according
to the terms on an earlier agreement. It seems likely the
psychological difference between these two financially
equivalent events would be substantial, even if we assume
that an employee in the first case should know that her
options could be clawed back under threat of termination.
Clawbacks would always be discretionary unless a firm
announced in advance that it intended to clawback all options
in the event of a big enough IPO, which would lead to
widespread employee dissatisfaction. Few employees will be
so dispassionate that they will acknowledge the justice of
being selected as one of the few whose options are being
clawed back. To the contrary, these employees are likely to
feel aggrieved. If employees know in advance that the value
of their options is capped, however, while they may wish they
had not agreed to those terms, they are unlikely to feel
cheated by the enforcement of terms they agreed to.
Similarly, employers may wish they had not agreed to a
provision like the one proposed here, which makes it
impossible to clawback options before an IPO or buyback.
The firm might wish it had set a lower cap or thought to
terminate the perfunctory employee enough in advance of the
liquidity event to avoid even the capped dilution the employee
will cause. But the firm is unlikely to feel aggrieved. The
costly suboptimal performance expected of aggrieved parties

172. See generally REUVEN BRENNER & GABRIELLE A. BRENNER, GAMBLING
AND SPECULATION: A THEORY, A HISTORY, AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN
DECISIONS 19–48 (1990) (speculating that people gamble in order to leapfrog).
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is unlikely to follow.
B. More Disclosure
This Article has proceeded under the realistic assumption
that if startup employees did not realize that firms could claw
back their unvested stock options, they do now, given the
notoriety of the Zynga clawback within the technology
industries.
Another more basic problem would exist,
however, if employees did not realize this. Even if employees
now realize in a general way that firms may claw back
unvested stock options, they do not have any authoritative
statement of this possibility, beyond what they have read
about Zynga on industry-focused websites. This problem can,
and probably should, be addressed under the disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws.
Private companies that use stock options to compensate
their employees typically rely on Rule 701 issued under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.173 Rule 701
provides a clearer exemption from registration under the
1933 Act than was available under the previously used
Sections 4(1) and 4(2).174 As private companies grow, it can
happen (and indeed did to Google and Facebook) that they
approach or crossover the boundary of a private company:
they have assets of more than $10 million and have at least
500 holders of any class of securities.175 When this happens,
they are subject to the reporting requirements of section 12(g)
of the 1934 Exchange Act.176 However, the SEC made
exceptions for companies that crossed this boundary because
they had issued stock options to many employees, and in 2007
it promulgated Rule 12h-1, which reflects the conditions it
had set out in various no-action letters, exempting
compensatory stock options, under certain conditions, from

173. Richard P. Plumridge & Jennifer D’Alessandro, Rule 701: Securities Act
of 1933 Exemption for Issuances Under Compensatory Benefit Plans, in PRIVATE
PLACEMENTS 2007, at 521, 524 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. 1598, 2007).
174. For a good introduction to the structure of the Securities Act of 1933, see
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Structure of the Securities Act of 1933, SR043 ALI-ABA
41 (May 13–14, 2010).
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a)(2) (2012).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4.
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Section 12(g).177 One of these conditions, relevant to us, is
that the company disclose to the option holder the risks
associated with the investment.178
The principal focus of this risk disclosure is the financial
condition of the company.179 However, it should certainly
count as a risk factor that an unvested stock option, though
granted, may be clawed back. Indeed, companies doubtless
disclose to employees far more remote risks associated with
their option than that it may simply be taken away under
various circumstances. If the SEC is going to require that
compensatory stock options be accompanied by risk
disclosures (at least in the case of a company relying on the
Rule 12h-1 exemption), then consistency requires that the
risk of a clawback be disclosed along with other less direct
risks.
One could argue that employees already know, and
receive adequate disclosure already, that they are at-will
employees and that their options remain unvested until they
remain in the employ of the company for certain periods of
time. They should know, one could argue, that if they
perform inadequately they will be terminated and lose their
unvested options, or that they may be demoted, and have to
accept a smaller stock option package. This common sense
understanding does not cover the equally likely case that
while the employee performed adequately or well—by all
accounts, after all, Google chef Ayers was a fine cook180—the
company may decide that in light of how valuable the
company has become, it believes it simply granted too many
options to the employee and wants some back. It is hard to
imagine a risk factor that would be more material than
that.181 Once company lawyers have developed standard
language disclosing this risk, the cost of including it in
disclosures would be low.

177. Exemption of Compensatory Employee Stock Options, 72 Fed. Reg.
69554 (Dec. 7, 2007).
178. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1(f)(1)(vi).
179. 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 4:14 (2012).
180. Levy, supra note 7, at 133.
181. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), for a
discussion of materiality in securities fraud cases.
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CONCLUSION
When Zynga clawed back unvested stock options before
its IPO, it arguably violated an informal but legally
unenforceable norm of Silicon Valley startup culture. At least
some of the commentary found on industry websites and in
The combination of at-will
the press suggested so.182
employment and generous stock option plans gives startups
extraordinary flexibility in both hiring and firing employees.
Firms can fire employees without cause and employees’
unvested options are evaporated, but employees can also
move freely among firms, looking for the one most likely to
achieve a big liquidity event. This flexibility for employers
inevitably opens to the door to employer opportunism.
Startups can terminate employees without cause after they
have irrevocably made valuable contributions, thus reducing
dilution of founders and investors but violating informal
understandings they had with employees for fair
compensation.
Any steps to curtail the possibility of opportunism,
unfortunately, must also involve reducing employer
flexibility. Whether the benefits of reducing opportunism
exceed the costs of less employer flexibility is best sorted out
by negotiation between talented potential employees and the
startups that want to hire them. In some cases, prospective
employees may wish to negotiate buyout rights that protect
them against opportunistic termination before a liquidity
event. This would make sense especially for prospective
employees who expect to make valuable contributions to a
startup’s value early in their term of employment, exposing
them to holdup.
Time will tell whether the Zynga clawback was an outlier
event conceived by a hyperaggressive CEO or a harbinger of
things to come in Silicon Valley. Cultural norms can be
delicate things, however, and what seem established
understandings can quickly transform or dissipate, especially
in dynamic industries. Silicon Valley employment practices
for most workers currently seem characterized by a great
182. Patricio Robles, Zynga Stomps on Silicon Valley Tradition: Report,
ECONSULTANCY (Nov. 11, 2011, 3:17 PM), http://econsultancy.com/us/blog/8258zynga-stomps-on-silicon-valley-tradition-report.
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legal flexibility for employers, where informal norms
regarding good employer behavior contain and regulate
employment relationships.183 Venture capital firms as repeat
players may play a crucial role in maintaining these norms.
Individual entrepreneurs, if they are rich and powerful
enough, may not be subject to these norms in the same way.
If fair employment compensation norms in technology hubs
do deteriorate (in the sense of permitting more opportunistic
behavior by startup firms), legally enforceable contractual
provisions constraining opportunism against employees may
be expected—or hoped—to take their place.

183. Homa Bahrami, The Emerging Flexible Organization: Perspectives from
Silicon Valley, 34 CAL. MGMT. REV., no.4, 1992 at 33, 35.

